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Abstract
This paper discusses the issue of modularity from a problem-solving perspective.
Modularity is in fact a decomposition heuristic, through which a complex problem
is decomposed into independent or quasi-independent sub-problems. By means of a
model of problem decomposition, this paper studies the trade-oﬀs of modularity: on
the one hand ﬁner modules increase the speed of search, but on the other hand they
usually determine lock-in into sub-optimal solutions. How eﬀectively to balance this
trade-oﬀ depends upon the problem environment and its complexity and volatility:
we show that in stationary and complex environments there exists an evolutionary
advantage to over-modularization, while in highly volatile – though “simple” – en-
vironments, contrary to usual wisdom, modular search is ineﬃcient. The empirical
relevance of our ﬁndings is discussed, especially with reference to the literature on
system integration.
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11 Introduction
In recent years, the concept of modularity has gained great visibility in a number of
disciplines as diverse as management (e.g. Schilling, 2000), organisational sciences (e.g.
Brusoni et al., 2001), economics (e.g. Langlois, 2002; Marengo et al., forthcoming), cogni-
tive sciences (e.g. Fodor, 1983), American studies (e.g. Blair, 1988) and architectural and
engineering design (e.g. Alexander, 1969; Suh, 1990). Overall, modularity has been pro-
posed as a powerful organising principle of the evolutionary processes of both artiﬁcial and
natural complex systems. Within social sciences, modularity principles have been applied
to explain the evolution of products, organizational design and knowledge management,
on the one hand; and the emerging patterns, and dynamics, of coordination and division of
labour between ﬁrms, on the other. This paper focuses on the implications of modularity
on problem-solving strategies.
It is often argued that, by adopting modular design strategies, ﬁrms can take respon-
sibility for the design and development of separate modules. Thus, they can develop new
products at a faster pace, as the integration of the ﬁnal product is a matter of mix and
match of ’black boxes’ (e.g. Baldwin and Clark, 2001; Baldwin and Clark, 2000; Sanchez
and Mahoney, 1996). This is made possible by advanced technological knowledge about
component interactions that can be used to fully specify and standardise component inter-
faces and, therefore, to decouple the design of the product architecture (i.e. arrangement
of functional elements) from the design of each module. Modularity, by simplifying de-
sign and development processes, would allow a greater division of labour across ﬁrms.
As a consequence, ﬁrms can focus their capabilities on few modules or on the architec-
ture. To fully exploit modularity, a ’grammar of action’ (Argyres, 1999), or ’design rules’
(Baldwin and Clark, 2000) have to be set in terms of neat and powerful routines that
govern interfaces at product and organisational levels. Modularity emerges as a speciﬁc
kind of problem-solving strategy, which entails a speciﬁc pattern of knowledge and task
partitioning.
On this basis, formal models start from the already set grammar, or rules, and focuses
on the exploitative aspects of modular design principles (Baldwin and Clark, 2000). Such
grammar of action sets the rules of interaction across module, but also deﬁnes the organ-
isation of problem-solving activities in terms of division of tasks, and their allocation to
decoupled design teams. A modular architecture generates more options than an integral
architecture because experimentation takes place at the level of the modules, rather than
at the entire product (Baldwin and Clark, 2000). The ﬁner the detail with which modules’
interfaces are deﬁned, the faster the pace of experimentation. That is to say, by adopting a
modular product design strategy ﬁrms can speed up the process of exploitation of a given
(modular) architecture.
When Baldwin and Clark (2001) discuss the advantages of modularity in terms of
option value, they assume that a modular design is able to generate more options, and
thus more value. They do so by analysing ’modularity as a ﬁnancial force [that] adds
options to and thereby increases the ﬁnancial value of complex design’ (Baldwin and
Clark, 2001, p.1, italics in original). We approach modularity as a speciﬁc example of
problem-solving strategy. From this complementary standpoint, it becomes interesting
to analyse what kind of problems can be framed and solved in a modular fashion (as
opposed to an integral one), what are the characteristics of the search spaces generated
by alternative problem-solving strategies, and what are the properties of the solutions so
identiﬁed in the presence of varying degrees of environmental uncertainty.
More speciﬁcally, this paper builds upon Kauﬀman’s work (Kauﬀman, 1993) exploring
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modular search strategies. First, given the competitive environment, we want to under-
stand whether there is a trade oﬀ between the ’speed’ of search (enabled by modularity)
and the ’breadth’ of search (enabled by non-modular search strategies). Apparently, mod-
ular search strategies are indeed highly eﬃcient in the short term (i.e., they provide ’higher
value’) enabling fast searches within a predeﬁned search space. However, these gains might
disappear in the long term, as ’slower’ (i.e., less modular) search strategies catch up and
reach better solutions as they can explore wider search spaces, exactly because they rely
on less tightly deﬁned ’design rules’. Second, and more fundamentally, we want to explore
the relationship between alternative search strategies and changing competitive environ-
ments. Does modularity pay oﬀ in the presence of fundamental uncertainty? This is a
basic question because, in dynamic terms, modularity may entail some risks: the more
deﬁned the grammar, and the search space it enables, the more structured, limited, and
limiting is the search process. Firms may miss value-generating alternatives because they
cannot escape the boundaries set by the existing modular design strategies.
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 focuses on recent empirical research on
modularity to highlight a few facts that demand an explanation. Section 3 introduced the
model that we develop to approach a few key issues related to the dynamic properties of
modularity. Section 4 presents the results and Section 5 concludes.
2 Modularity and problem-solving in organizations
One of the fundamental contributions of recent research on modularity is the identiﬁcation
of a series of constructs and key relationships that allows the connection to be studied be-
tween what ﬁrms do, how they do it, and what they need to know in order to it. Research
on modularity reminds us about the complexity of the relationship between conceptuali-
sations of ﬁrms as knowledge structures, and of ﬁrms as producers of goods and services.
The need to disentangle this complex relationship is of paramount importance for both
practical and theoretical reasons. First, in the context of increasingly globalised markets,
ever more complex supply chains, and international manufacturing networks, corporate
decision-making processes involve more and more actors, variables and criteria which lead
to less and less transparency about who is deciding what, and on what basis. Second,
and relatedly, the notion of ’means of production’ has less and less to do with hardware,
and more and more to do with information and specialised knowledge. Management tasks
increasingly involve the monitoring, control and co-ordination of a widening range of use-
ful, but highly heterogeneous, scientiﬁc and technological disciplines that are embodied in
products of increasing complexity, in terms of components and functionalities.
Modularity, as a product and organisational design strategy, provides a possible an-
swer to understand how this complex relationship is governed by modern corporations.
Modularity allows the decoupling of complex artefacts into less complex, self-contained
modules; each module, at the extreme, could become the sole business of a specialist ﬁrm,
which would be only responsible over the speciﬁc module on which it focuses. Modular-
ity makes complexity manageable by making it possible to run experiments at the level
of modules, rather than the entire artefact, and in parallel (Baldwin and Clark, 2001).
Moreover, modularity is ’tolerant of uncertainty’ because particular elements of a modular
design may be changed after unforeseen contingencies emerge, as long as the design rules
are obeyed (ibid.).
The advantages of modularity seem to be particularly compelling in high technology
settings, such as the aircraft engine industry. For example, two competing aircraft engine
3architectures are employed in the industry, namely two-shaft and three-shaft. According
to industry experts, the three-shaft (launched by Rolls-Royce in the early 1970s) has
turned out to be more eﬀective in accommodating evolving customer requirements in
terms of engine power due to its more modular architecture. In a three-shaft engine,
the compression work is split across three compressors (low-, intermediate-, and high-
pressure). Each compressor can be driven by its own turbine at its optimum speed. In
a three-shaft design the mapping between functions and physical structures tends to be
more one-to-one. A three-shaft engine, therefore, is more modular than a two-shaft. In a
two-shaft design, in fact, the compression work is split between two compressors. The fan
and the booster run on the same shaft. They rotate at relatively low speed to maintain
the fan tip speed below supersonic. This limits the compression that can be achieved in
the ﬁrst part of the engine leaving high duty on the high-pressure compressor.
The embedded modularity of the three-shaft design enabled Rolls-Royce to exploit
the same architecture, hence cutting the high development costs of new engines, to cater
for a broader range of power requirements. The so-called thrust growth capability of the
three-shaft has been much larger than the two-shaft. The thrust ratings of the JT9D
and CF6 engine two-shaft families go from 44,250lb to 56,000lb and from 40,000lb to
64,500lb, respectively. Due to the exhausted growth potential of the JT9D and CF6 engines
and to increasing thrust requirements asked by airlines to power larger aircraft, Pratt &
Whitney and GE Aircraft Engines had to develop new engine families, the PW4000 and the
GE90, respectively. Instead, the three-shaft architecture has been characterised by higher
thrust growth. Rolls-Royce stretched the same engine architecture (the RB211) to develop
engines from 42,000lb to 115,000lb. The in-built growth capability of the three-shaft design
due to its more modular architecture gave Rolls-Royce a clear competitive advantage
in terms of speed of development of new engines. In fact, they were able to introduce
incremental changes in the original architecture (mixing and matching components) to
meet a wider variety of aircraft makers’ needs than their competitors. Emblematic is the
example of the Trent engine 500 that has become the sole engine for the Airbus A340-
500/600.
However, as noted by Baldwin and Clark (2000), the adoption of modular design
strategies brings about costs too. First, the creation and dissemination of design rules
is a rather expensive activity. Experimenting and testing on diﬀerent modules is also
costly. Moreover, increasing division of labour among ﬁrms also entails the traditional costs
associated with the use of the market system (i.e., transaction costs) as well as agency costs
related to the hold-up problem. The costs of creating the design rules deserve particular
attention. Developing modular architectures is more diﬃcult than developing integral ones.
Achieving modularity requires a very precise understanding of the product functionalities,
how they are allocated to components, and how the components interact. Thus, the choice
of product architecture should be related to a company’s product strategy. Ulrich (1995)
argued that if a company wants to stress product performances, then the most appropriate
choice would be the integral architecture, since global performance characteristics are
optimised through this type of architecture. On the other hand, companies wanting to
emphasise product change and variety, ﬂexibility and upgradability, may well choose a
modular architecture.
Furthermore, there are other costs related to developing a modular architecture. One
must also consider the costs of the foregone opportunities that might have been exploited
adopting diﬀerent architectural choices. This problem is particularly cogent in an innova-
tive context. The crucial point is the change of unit of selection that modularity implies
with respect to an integral system: having ’ﬁne’ rather than ’coarse’ units of selection
4makes the search process faster (selection operates on the ﬁner scale of modules and there-
fore the selection environment is in a sense ’richer’) but essentially ’local’ and gets quickly
locked into a local optimum, whereas in an integral system search is global, which implies
that there is no lock-in, but search is much slower and in complex space there is a lot of
wasteful search as nonsensical options can be generated.
Generally speaking, modularity can indeed highly increase the number of options gen-
erated and the speed of search for each module by creating standard interfaces between
modules, but cannot avoid the lock-in. Modularity will make the system climb the lo-
cal optimum faster, but cannot make it jump to another, higher valued, local optimum
(Fleming and Sorenson, 2001). This can only be done by changing the architecture of
modules. However, if companies embedded in a modular network design their interface,
and specialised capabilities, around the current product architecture, how can they learn
about alternative architectures? ’[L]earning about changes in the architecture of the prod-
uct is unlikely to occur naturally’ (Henderson and Clark, 1990, p.28). Not only does
learning about the architecture require dedicated eﬀorts, but it also entails diﬀerent kinds
of organisations, people and skills (Brusoni and Prencipe, 2001). Moreover, ’architectural
knowledge can emerge only after an organisation has developed suﬃcient experience with
a problem to be able to fragment it into elements without losing critical information’
(Henderson, 1992, p.127). Once an organisation recognises an architectural innovation as
such, it has to change its ’orientation from one of reﬁnement within a stable architecture
to one of active search for new solutions.’ (Henderson and Clark, 1990, p.17)
This change of orientation is what ’systems integrating’ ﬁrms can do. Systems inte-
grators are companies that rely on wide and dispersed networks of suppliers of specialised
components and capabilities, yet maintain broad and deep in-house capabilities. These
are ﬁrms that ’know more than they make’ (Brusoni et al., 2001) in order to be able to
co-ordinate loosely coupled networks of suppliers, but also introduce new product archi-
tectures. The case of Fujitsu exempliﬁes the role played by systems integrators in the case
of the hard-disk drive network. Fujitsu successfully managed the introduction of a new
product architecture, stemming from a major technological breakthrough embodied into
the magneto-resistive head, a component that displaced the pre-existing mechanical based
technology. Relying on the modular architecture of the established product, Fujitsu, like
other ﬁrms, relied on a decoupled network of external suppliers. However, unlike its com-
petitors, Fujitsu continued to invest ’in systems knowledge and materials and component
technology in its R&D labs.’ (Chesbrough and Kusunoki, 2001, p.218) Fujitsu’s systems
knowledge went well beyond the range of products and components that the company
produced in house. It enabled the ﬁrm to master the new, fast-moving technology and to
navigate the dangerous waters of architectural innovation stemming from it. By knowing
more than it needed for its own design and production, Fujitsu managed to avoid compe-
tency traps such as those described by Chesbrough and Kusunoki (2001) and Henderson
and Clark (1990).
Brusoni et al. (2001) argued that cases like Fujitsu’s show that decoupled, modu-
lar networks coordinated through markets and the exchange of codiﬁed knowledge (cfr.
Sturgeon, 2002) are but particular cases of a more general model which link ﬁrms’ knowl-
edge and production boundaries. They argued that truly modular networks could emerge
only when product interdependencies are predictable and when the specialised bodies
of knowledge required are at the same stage of development. Interdependencies across
components are predictable when a change in the design of one component entails a well-
understood change in the design of other components and vice versa. The personal com-
puter industry seems to fall into this situation (Langlois and Robertson, 1992). However,
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activity is required to secure agreement about the estimates that will be used as a basis
for action. Vertical integration facilitates such co-ordination.’ (Teece, 1976, p.13). The
automotive industry seems to fall into this category (Sako and Murray, 1999). Similarly,
Davies (1999) studied the case of products characterized by unpredictable interdependen-
cies across components as well as imbalances at the technological level: mobile phone
systems. He showed that under high technological and environmental uncertainty, tightly
coupled organizations in which integrated ﬁrms maintain in house both the knowledge
and the production activities involved in the design and production of their ﬁnal products
and component units, have a competitive advantage. The advantage of a ’single ven-
dor solution’ lies in the supplier’s experience in delivering ’a veriﬁed system in which all
the components work well together, and can be integrated, tested and ready for service
more rapidly than is possible in multivendor solutions.’ (Davies, 1999, p.120) Speciﬁcally,
Davies argued that the key advantage of Ericsson, the world leader throughout the 1990s,
was its constant involvement in both architectural and component innovations, as well
as its eﬀorts to control production costs. It is worth noting that Ericsson adopted such
a broad innovation strategy while introducing a modular approach to system design, in
which core systems -centrally designed- were then adapted by regional ’competence cen-
tres.’ (Edquist, 2003) However, this modular approach was accompanied, and enabled, by
the development of in-house ’system competency’, i.e. the competencies to design, build,
market and support the entire system (McKelvey and Texier, 2000).
This is a key insight for understanding the dynamic trade oﬀ implied by modular search
strategies. Companies like Ericsson, operating under conditions of fundamental techno-
logical and environmental uncertainty, have not disintegrated to be replaced by modular
networks of specialised innovators. Quite the opposite, they have zealously invested into
both the exploitation of the current standard, and into explorative activities to shape the
next generation standard. Given the incredibly rapid rate of change in the technologies,
regulatory environments, and competitive landscapes, ﬁrms like Ericsson could not run
the risk of remaining stuck in any one speciﬁc research trajectory. Hence, the need to be
involved throughout the 1990s in all the major development eﬀorts that led the industry
from the 1G mobile phone systems, to the still recent launch of 3G. Firms that followed
more ’specialised’ strategies lost their role of leaders despite their very early entry into the
arena.
The above discussion informs the modeling exercise reported in the next section. First,
we analyse formally the advantages brought about by modularity in terms of speed of adap-
tation to changing customer needs, highlighted by the Rolls Royce case. We show that
speed of adaptation can give evolutionary advantages even though over-modular search
strategies may not be the most eﬃcient problem-solving strategy. Secondly, we explore
the dynamic trade oﬀs of modular and integral problem-solving strategies under conditions
of fundamental uncertainty. Building upon the evidence summarized above, which focus on
the role played by ’systems integrators’, we show that integral problem-solving strategies
may provide a way out to ﬁrms caught by surprise by unexpected changes in their com-
petitive environment. Modular problem-solving strategies instead prevent organizations
from rapidly abandoning their established way of doing things.
3 Model structure
Our model is made up of two elements: the problem space, which is exogenously given
and characterized by a given degree of diﬃculty (expressed in terms of sub-problem de-
6composability) and the problem solving organization which searches in the problem
space for superior solutions and tries to implement them. We assume that the organization
is boundedly rational and therefore carries out its activities through a process of adaptive
trial-and-error; at the same time, we also assume that this adaptive search is not purely
random but is based on a (albeit possibly wrong) representation of the problem-space.
3.1 Problem Space
The problem-space is an extension and generalization of Kauﬀman’s NK model of ﬁtness
landscapes (Kauﬀman, 1993). A ﬁtness landscape is simply a mapping from a vector
characterizing an entity’s form to a payoﬀ value. The original structure developed by
Kauﬀman postulated a random interaction structure where a given element interacted
with K randomly speciﬁed other elements. In the spirit of Simon’s work on nearly decom-
posable systems and building on the modelling approaches of Marengo and Dosi (2003)
and Marengo et al. (2000) we characterize problem environments as potentially consisting
of more structured patterns of interaction. In particular, we develop and use two notions of
complexity of a problem environment, namely decompositions and near-decompositions,
which give a precise indication of the degree to which the problem can be decomposed
into independent or quasi independent sub-problems (modules). As shown also in Frenken
et al. (1999) Kauﬀman’s ’K’ can be a bad indicator of the decomposability of the prob-
lem: since blocks of epistatic interactions overlap and because of the randomness of ﬁtness
contributions, also problems with very low K values can be de facto non-decomposable.
More formally, the problem space is deﬁned by N interdependent features which, for
simplicity and without loss of generality, can assume only two states, labelled 0 and 1. The
set of features comprising the problem space consists of ℵ = {x1,x2,...,xN}, with xi ∈




N. The set of conﬁgurations is characterized as: X = {x1,x2,...,x2N
}.
The value, or ﬁtness function, consists of a mapping from the set of conﬁgurations to the
positive real numbers: V : X → ℜ+. A problem is therefore deﬁned by the couple (X,V ).
As the size of the set of conﬁgurations is exponential in the number of components,
whenever the latter is large enough, the state space of problem becomes much too vast to
be extensively searched by agents with bounded computational capabilities. One way of
reducing its size is to decompose it into sub-spaces1. Let ℑ = {1,2,...,N} be the set of
indexes, and let a block di ⊆ ℑ be a non-empty subset of this set, and let | di | be the
size of block di, i.e., its cardinality.
We deﬁne a decomposition scheme (or simply decomposition) of the space ℵ as
a set of blocks:




Note that a decomposition does not necessarily have to be a partition; that is, there
may be some overlap among the particular decompositions di.
Decompositions structure the nature of the organizational and technological search
process. Search for alternative bases of action does not take place on a holistic, system-wide
basis but tends to be local and to approach diﬀerent facets of the problem in a sequential
manner (Cyert and March, 1956). In this spirit, a new conﬁguration is generated and tested
by picking a block dj ∈ D at random and some (at least one and up to all) components in
1A decomposition can be considered as a special case of a search heuristic. Search heuristics are in fact
ways of reducing the number of conﬁgurations to be considered in a search process.
7this block (and only in this block) are mutated, obtaining a new conﬁguration xh which
may diﬀer from the original conﬁguration xi only in those components belonging to block
di. If V (xh) ≥ V (xi), then xh is retained and becomes the new current conﬁguration;
otherwise, xh is discarded and xi continues to be the current conﬁguration.
We say that a decomposition scheme D∗ is an optimal decomposition of the problem if
multiple iterations of this search procedure are always able (after repeated random muta-
tions) to locate the globally optimal conﬁguration(s), starting from any initial conﬁgura-
tions. That is, the scheme is such that there is no lock-in into suboptimal conﬁgurations.
In general, there can be many optimal decomposition2. For instance, if D∗ is an optimal
decomposition, all decompositions which can be obtained by the union of some of its blocks
will also be optimal decomposition. However, among the set of decompositions satisfying
this criterion, we are particularly interested in the ﬁnest optimal decomposition(s), i.e., the
one(s) whose blocks have minimal cardinality. Blocks in the ﬁnest optimal decompositions
represent the ﬁnest sub-problems into which the overall problem can be decomposed and
still be optimally solved.
We can classify problems in terms of their ﬁnest optimal decomposition. In particular,
the following types will be widely referred to in our subsequent analysis:
1. Non-decomposable problem, for which the ﬁnest optimal decomposition is the de-
generate one: D∗ = {1,2,... ,N}
2. Nearly-decomposable problems (Simon, 1981) whose ﬁnest optimal decomposition
is made of non-disjointed (partially overlapping) blocks. Two cases are particularly
interesting:
• partially overlapping blocks, such as for instance:
D∗ = {1,2,3,4},{3,4,5,6},{5,6,7,8}}
• nested blocks, such as for instance:
D∗ = {1},{1,2},{1,2,3},{1,2,3,4},... ,{1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8}}
3. Decomposable problems, whose optimal decomposition is made only of disjointed
blocks. Furthermore, this decomposition of disjointed blocks can be:
• coarse, if blocks are not all singletons (i.e., they contain more than one compo-
nent)
• ﬁne, if all blocks are singletons (i.e., they contain only one component)
Only in this last case is the problem ’simple’ and optimally solvable through N separate
local search processes and therefore fully modularizable.
3.2 Techno-Organizational Problem-Solving
A decomposition scheme is a sort of template which determines how new conﬁgurations are
generated and can therefore be tested by a selection mechanism. In large search spaces in
which only a very small subset of all possible conﬁgurations can be generated and undergo
testing, the procedure employed to generate such new conﬁgurations plays a key role in
deﬁning the set of attainable ﬁnal conﬁgurations.
2See Marengo and Dosi (2003) for a more formal and detailed account of the properties of optimal and
sub-optimal decompositions and for an algorithmic procedure which computes them.
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by the growing literature on modularity in technologies and organizations (Baldwin and
Clark, 2000) and decomposition schemes are a formalization of the notion of system archi-
tecture which deﬁnes the set of modules in which a technological system or an organization
are decomposed
We will assume that boundedly rational agents can only search locally in directions
which are given by the decomposition scheme: new conﬁgurations are generated and tested
in the neighborhood of the given one, where neighbors are new conﬁgurations obtained by
changing some (possibly all) components within a given module.
Among all the decomposition schemes of a given problem, we are especially inter-
ested in those for which the global optimum becomes reachable from any starting con-
ﬁguration. One such decomposition always exists, and is the degenerate decomposition
D = {{1,2,3,... ,N}} for which of course there exists only one local optimum and it
coincides with the global one. But obviously we are interested in – if they exist – ﬁner
decompositions and in particular in those of minimum size. The latter decompositions
represent the maximum extent to which the search space can be subdivided into indepen-
dent modules coordinated by a simple selection mechanism, with the property that such
selection processes can eventually lead to optimality from any starting condition. On the
contrary, even ﬁner decompositions will not in general (unless the starting conﬁguration
is “by chance”within the basin of attraction of the global optimum) allow decentralized
selection processes to optimize.
Minimum size decomposition schemes can be found recursively with the following pro-
cedure which we describe informally3:
Let us re-arrange all the conﬁgurations in X by descending rank X = {x0,x1,...,x2N−1}
where xi   xi+1.
The minimum size decomposition can be computed as follows:
1. start with the ﬁnest decomposition D0 = {{1},{2},... ,{N}}
2. check whether x0 ∈ P(xi,D) ∀xi i = 1,2,...,2N − 1, i.e., if there is a path leading
to the global optimum from every other conﬁguration for decomposition D, if yes
STOP
3. if no, build a new decomposition D1 by union of the ﬁnest blocks for which condition
2 was violated and go back to 2.
Let us ﬁnally provide an example for illustration.
Example: consider a system of 3 binary components and imagine having a selection










3The complete algorithm is quite lengthy to describe in exhaustive and precise terms. Its Pascal and
C++ implementations are available from the authors upon request. See also Marengo and Dosi (2003) for
a more formal treatment of decompositions and their properties.
9If the system is fully modular (i.e., there are three modules {1},{2} and {3}) and
the current state is 001 then search will always be locked into the local optimum 010
and never reach the higher value solution 100. To see this just notice that there is
no one-mutation and value-increasing path leading from 001 to 100: for instance the
ﬁrst module, which is initially set to 0 can never switch to its optimal conﬁguration 1
because switching to 1 always decreases the value given to the other modules. In order
to ensure that maximum value can always be achieved one needs coarser modules: for
instance in this example the ﬁnest possible set of modules is composed of two modules:
{1,2} and {3}.
3.3 Near decomposability
When building a decomposition scheme for a problem, we have looked so far for perfect
decomposability, in the sense that we require that all blocks can be optimized in a totally
independent way from the others. In this way we are guaranteed to decompose the problem
into perfectly isolated components which can be solved independently. This is however very
stringent a requirement: even when interdependencies are rather weak, but diﬀused across
all components, we easily tend to observe problems for which no perfect decomposition
exists.
One can soften the requirement of perfect decomposability into one of near-decomposability:
one no longer requires the problem to be decomposed into completely separated sub-
problems, i.e., sub-problems which fully contain all interdependencies, but only wants
sub-problems to contain the most “relevant”interdependencies whereas less relevant ones
can persist across sub-problems. In this way, optimizing each sub-problem independently
will not necessarily lead to the global optimum, but to a “good”solution. In other words we
construct near-decompositions which give a precise measure of the trade-oﬀ between de-
centralization and optimality: higher degrees of decentralization and market coordination,
and therefore higher speed of adaptation, can be obtained at expenses of the optimality
of the solutions which can be reached.
Let us re-arrange all the conﬁgurations in X by descending rank X = {x0,x1,...,x2N−1}
where xi   xi+1, and let Xµ = {x0,x1,...,xµ−1} with 0 ≤ µ ≤ 2N − 1 be the ordered set
of the best µ conﬁgurations.
We say that Xµ is reachable from a conﬁguration y / ∈ Xµ and for decomposition D if
there exists a conﬁguration xi ∈ Xµ such that xi ∈ P(y,D).
We call basin of attraction Ψ(Xµ,D) of Xµ for decomposition D the set of all conﬁgura-
tions from which Xµ is reachable. If Ψ(Xµ,D) = X we say that D is a µ-decomposition
for the problem.
µ-decompositions of minimum size can be found algorithmically with a straightfor-
ward generalization of the above algorithm which computes minimum size decomposition
schemes for optimal decompositions.
Higher degrees of decomposition and decentralization can be attained by giving up
optimality and providing a precise measure for this trade-oﬀ. In order to provide an
example we generated random problems4 of size N = 12 all characterized by |D| = 12 (i.e.,
they are not decomposable). Figure 1 shows the sizes of the minimum size decomposition
schemes as we vary the number m of acceptable conﬁgurations (average on 100 random
landscapes).
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Figure 1: Near decomposability
This ﬁgure shows that sharp reductions of complexity and time of search5 can be
obtained by accepting sub-optimal “satisﬁcing” solutions. Thus there is a trade-oﬀ between
optimality and speed of search which has interesting implications which will be examined
in the next section.
4 Speed and Optimality of Search strategies
4.1 The evolutionary advantage of excess modularity
So far we have characterized a system in terms of its decomposability. Now, using this
toolbox we are able to construct a problem whose structure is perfectly known and then test
the relative eﬃciency of diﬀerent search strategies. We will concentrate on the comparison
among research strategies based upon diﬀerent degrees of modularity. A search strategy
consists of a rule that produces a new conﬁguration starting from a current one; if the new
conﬁguration is better than the previous one it is retained, otherwise it is discarded.
In general, fully modular search strategies, i.e. those in which each component is
optimized independently of the others, are not optimal (Kauﬀman, 1993) as they can
locate the globally optimal conﬁguration only if there are no interdependencies among
components.
In Frenken et al. (1999), the properties of other search strategies are analyzed based
upon coarser modules. In fact, we can consider a search strategy that divides the N com-
ponents of the conﬁguration in modules, each containing a given number of components,
say S6. The generalized S-search strategy consists of choosing one module (instead of a
single component) and mutating one or more components in the module.
Put more precisely, the steps of a generalized S-search strategy are: 1) choose randomly
5Every reduction of 1 in the size of the decomposition schemes implies that the number of solutions to
be tested and the expected time of search are cut down by one half
6Without loss of generality and for the sake of simplicity, we assume that each group module contains
exactly S components and, therefore, that N/S is an integer number.
11one of the N/S modules; 2) choose randomly an integer number Z in the range [1,S]; 3)
choose randomly Z bits among the S of the chosen module; 4) switch the state of the
selected bits; 5) test the ﬁtness of the newly produced string; 6) accept the new string if
it produces a higher ﬁtness than the current string, or reject it otherwise7.
We can draw a parallel between the complexity of the problem (decomposability) and
the search strategy (modularity). For example, suppose that we consider a problem whose
minimal decomposition is: 1,2,3,4,5, 6,7,8,9,10, ..., N-4,N-3,N-2,N-1,N. Obviously, a S-
strategy based upon the same modules is always able to reach the optimal conﬁguration.
Instead, lower dimensional S-strategies (ﬁner modules) are usually locked into local optima.
Higher level S-strategies (larger modules) are still able to ﬁnd the global maximum, but
they take much longer.






Figure 2: Average ﬁtness values of three populations searching on a problem space with
N=40. The ﬁrst population (black series) adopts S=1, the second S=5 (red series) and
the third S=10 (green series).
Figure 2 shows a simulation on a random problem ` a la Kauﬀman (1993) of three pop-
ulations of 100 agents each, that independently search a random problem of size N=40
and optimally decomposable into 10 modules of size 5 each, starting from the same (ran-
domly drawn) initial conﬁguration. The three populations adopt search strategies based
upon modules of size, respectively, 1,5 and 10. In other words the ﬁrst class of agents are
over-modularized, the second use optimal modules and the third are under-modularized.
All agents with the “optimal” strategy at the end of the simulation have managed to
reach the global maximum, having explored 10,000 conﬁgurations (a portion of less than
1/1010 of the total number of conﬁgurations). Instead, none of the agents in the other two
populations manage to reach the optimum in the same time. Over-modular agents in the
ﬁrst population quickly get stuck in diﬀerent local optima, from which they are unable
to unlock. The third population, though moving continuously up-hill, is very slow, since
they explore a much larger portion of the search space.
This property of the S-strategy derives from an analytical result that shows that the
maximum number of strings required to be tested in order to select with certainty the
maximum ﬁtness is a linear function of 2K+1 (Frenken et al., 1999).
7Obviously, the S-search strategy with S=1 is the one bit mutation.
12This result concerns “modular” worlds, where basic components are grouped into mod-
ules and components within a module inﬂuence each other’s performance, while having no
relation with components outside their module. In these cases the correct way to search for
the optimal conﬁguration of the components is to act at the level of modules, since acting
at the level of components is bound to provide sub-optimal solutions, whereas working at
higher levels is too slow.
However, if we consider the initial steps of the simulations, reported in Figure 3, we can
see that the ﬁrst population of agents adopting the ﬁnest modules possesses a big initial
advantage over the “optimal” strategy, lasting for many periods, although its agents are
doomed to be stuck in a local optima. Why this temporary advantage? The reason lies
in the quicker response of the modular strategy (S=1) in respect to the more integrated
ones. The strategy aiming at testing smaller variations of the current string is able to
test a higher number of possibilities, quickly improving the ﬁtness in the beginning of the
search.






Figure 3: First 300 steps of the same results shown in Figure 2
The advantage of the more modular strategy in the ﬁrst population for the initial
period may produce interesting dynamic properties. Suppose that the search strategy is
used as an evolutionary competition among individuals of diﬀerent species. The ﬁtness
value of an agent provides its probability of being removed from the population and of
producing an oﬀ-spring of its same species.
The selection mechanism can be simply represented by the removal of a ﬁxed number
of agents (the ones with the worst ﬁtness values) and their replacement with “copies” of
the best ones, where a copy is a new agent adopting the search strategy of the copied agent
(i.e., the same modularity), and being assigned an initial random conﬁguration. Figure 4
shows the number of agents in each population with the same settings as above, with the
selection mechanism acting every 50 time steps.
Clearly, the ﬁrst population can exploit its initial advantage, whereas the “optimal”
strategy (and even more so less modular) do not have the time to unfold their superiority.
In other terms, while strategy with S=5 is globally optimal, under the selection pressure
it can become evolutionary dominated by a modular strategy that, though prevented from
reaching the global optimum, is faster in reaching moderately higher results. This property
gives the modular strategy an evolutionary edge over integrated strategies.






Figure 4: Number of agents in the three populations with S=1 (black), S=5 (red) and
S=10 (green). Selection applies every 50 time steps, replacing 20 agents.
These results show that a trade-oﬀ exists between speed and optimality. Aiming at the
optimal solution of a problem entails the necessity of taking into account account all the
interdependencies among components. However, this enlarges enormously the space to be
searched and therefore the time required to explore it. Conversely, an over-modular ap-
proach focused on the exploration of each component independently from the others, may
be doomed to be limited in the maximum performance that can be ﬁnally obtained, but
has the advantage of providing quick-and-dirty improvements that, in a highly competitive
environment, may be the key to evolutionary success.
4.2 Volatility and the Revenge of Integrated Systems
We have seen that a modular search strategy enjoys an evolutionary advantage both when
the problem space is actually decomposable and also when it is not so, because of higher
speed of adaptation. There are, however, cases when an integrated search strategy outper-
forms modular ones: this happens contrary to the current wisdom8, when the environment
is highly volatile.
In this section in fact we show that when the ﬁtness values of conﬁgurations change
rapidly, then even if at that moment in time the problem space is fully decomposable,
modular strategies are rapidly outperformed and selected out by integrated ones. A mod-
ular search strategy consistently climbs up from its current position with “steps” which
are smaller the ﬁner the modules. On the contrary, an integrated search strategy can
“jump” to locations far away from the current one. In a stable environment the former
strategy is more eﬀective as it quickly climbs a local optimum while the latter spends a
long time wandering around the problem space. But in a highly volatile environment, it
can happen that an agent ﬁnds itself in a location with very low ﬁtness (the bottom of
a “well”): in this case short steps will be too slow a strategy for climbing out of the low
ﬁtness area, while long jumps have a high probability of quickly ﬁnding a higher ﬁtness
8Baldwin and Clark (2000) for instance maintain that modularity is especially advantageous in uncertain
and changing environments. See also Langlois (2002).
14level9. Conversely, when agents are in a high ﬁtness location, the integrated strategy has
a much lower probability of bringing about a further improvement than a modular one,








































Figure 5: Average percentage of agents producing a successful mutation as a function of
the average ﬁtness values for two populations: the ﬁrst applies a one-bit mutation strategy
(Modular) and the second applies a N-bit search strategy (Integral). Simulation performed
with N=1000, K=0. The two populations are made up of 50 agents each, running for 10,000
time steps. At each time step all agents are relocated in the same (randomly chosen) point
The superiority of integrated strategies is the outcome of two factors: probability of
improvement and expected size of improvement. Concerning the probability, a modular
strategy is only slightly more likely to provide a ﬁtness improvement when applied to
a low ﬁtness point than to a high ﬁtness one. Instead, integrated strategies are much
more likely to provide improvements when the current ﬁtness is low, and very much more
unlikely when it is high. To conﬁrm this statement, in Figure 5 we show the percentage
of successful mutations produced in two populations using a modular and an integrated
search strategy respectively.
Concerning the size of the improvement, the integrated strategy is likely to provide
large improvements when starting from low ﬁtness locations, whereas it will provide low
improvements when the starting location has high ﬁtness. The modular approach will
provide small improvements in both circumstances (see Figure 6).
This result contradicts the common wisdom that modularity provides robustness against
volatile environments. In fact, it shows that the opposite is true. In highly volatile en-
vironments, the systemic recombination allowed by integrated and non-modular search
strategies allows for the radical change which is much more appropriate than the local
search which characterizes modular search.
This result is also conﬁrmed when the volatility concerns only part of the system and
agents know which parts are aﬀected. That is, we use a shock that modiﬁes randomly
9A more formal treatment of this proposition can be found in Valente (2003), where it is shown that
















































Figure 6: Average gain from successful mutations as a function of the average ﬁtness
values. Same conditions as in Fig. 5.
the ﬁtness provided by half of the available dimensions, instead of modifying all of them.
When the shock occurs, agents know which half of their environment has been aﬀected
and direct the mutation eﬀorts to repair that portion of their current activities.
For this second experiment we deﬁned two populations of agents, where the integrated
strategy can modify either the ﬁrst or the second half of the string. We allowed agents to
apply their strategy for 20 time steps, after which a shock produces the modiﬁcation of
the ﬁtness contributions provided by half of the bits. Immediately after the shock agents
attempt a mutation choosing one (for modular strategies) or more (for integrated ones) of
the bits aﬀected by the shock.
The results do not change sensibly, though in this experiment modular agents were
allowed to climb a stable environment for some time, and the shock aﬀected only half of
the environment. It can be noticed that the “clouds” of points is in fact centered above
the expected ﬁtness value of 0.5, since agents are able to climb somewhat from the average
level during the 20 stable periods.
Figures 7 and 8 report the same statistics seen above for this new set up, considering
only the time steps immediately after the shocks. Figure 8 reports the average gain from
successful mutations whereas Figure 7 reports the percentage of successful mutations for
integrated and modular strategies.
5 Discussion and Conclusions
Taking a complementary perspective to Baldwin and Clark (2001)’s ﬁnancial view of
modularity, this paper has attempted to single out the advantages and disadvantages of
problem-solving strategies in relation to the time horizon of the search and the volatility of
the environment. Simulation results show that modular search strategies are particularly
eﬃcient in the short-term. This is due to the fact that modular search strategies enable a








































Figure 7: Percentage of successful mutations for two populations of “modular” and “inte-
grated”. N=100, K=50, and a shock aﬀecting either the ﬁrst or the second 50 dimensions
occur every 20 steps. Agents “know” which half of the environment underwent the shock
and attempt to repair that part. Data used for the ﬁgure concern only the periods just
after a shock.
is therefore an important advantage of modularity. Our results also showed that there is a
cogent trade-oﬀ between speed of search and breadth of search, however. In the long-term,
integral search strategies reach higher picks. By enabling a broader search, integral search
strategies slowly catch up with and eventually overtake modular ones in terms of solutions
reached. According to our study, the advantages of modularity tend to be short-lived
because of intrinsic limitations. Modular search strategies enable a quick adaptation and
a rapid improvement of ﬁtness, but this focuses the search process on close local optima
and prevents searching in the broader context.
However, short-term advantages may lead to sustainable evolutionary advantages at
the population level. That is to say, populations of organizations that rely on over-modular
problem-solving strategies may come to dominate populations of organizations that know
the ’right’ pattern of modularization, even though their problem-solving strategies do not
deliver the highest ﬁtness solution. In a rather speculative manner, one might argue that
this result captures a key feature of the competitive struggle in the PC industry. The open
and modular architecture of IBM-compatible PCs has given Microsoft (and Intel) a great
competitive advantage over Apple with its proprietary and more integrated architecture.
Despite some experts’ opinion that Apple can deliver better technical solutions, Microsoft
deﬁnitely is the market leader.
The paper also analyzed the eﬀectiveness of alternative search strategies in relation to
diﬀerent characteristics of the competitive environment. The dimension of the environment















































Figure 8: Average gain from successful mutations for two populations of “modular” and
“integrated” agents with random changes of ﬁtness contributions on half of the compo-
nents. Same conditions as in ﬁg. 7.
environments, modular search strategies are more eﬀective because of the above-mentioned
fast response attitude. For example, one might argue that this was the situation enjoyed
by Rolls Royce in the 1980s and 1990s, i.e., two decades during which the civil aviation
industry went through a phase of continuous and stable growth. Whether the competitive
advantage built upon the modular architecture of the three-shaft engine is defendable in
a more turbulent environment is to be seen. Our simulation results would suggest some
(preliminary) skepticism.
In highly volatile environments, modular search strategies are shown to become trapped
in local optima and incapable of moving to diﬀerent ones. This is due to the fact that
modular search strategies enable only small deﬁnite changes that do not allow jumping
away from local optima that become wells when the competitive environment suddenly
changes. On the contrary, an integral search strategy might well enable large improve-
ments that are able to jump to locations distant from, and safer than, the current one.
In our view, this result captures the key role played by systems integrating companies.
For example, evidence from the mobile phone industry suggests that systems integrators
need to remain involved in exploratory research that looks beyond the boundaries set by
current architectures in order to be able to lead the process of development of successive
generations of mobile telephony systems. The narrow, but fast, search enabled by over
modular problem-solving strategies might lock incumbents into peaks that, once turned
into wells, they will not be able to escape because of their inability to ’jump’ toward new
local optima.
The line of reasoning presented in this paper needs be extended in several directions.
Two seem most promising to us. First, in this paper we have conceptualized, and modeled,
18organizations as ’pure’ problem solvers. While problem solving is a fundamental activity
performed by organizations, it is not the only one. It is necessary to build models capable of
providing richer characterizations of ﬁrm behavior. This is not just a quest for realism. In a
previous paper, we argued that decisions to outsource production (and other functions) are
diﬀerent from decisions to outsource technological knowledge. In other words, there is a gap
between ﬁrm production and knowledge boundaries (Brusoni and Prencipe, 2001; Brusoni
et al., 2001). Such a gap is fundamental in explaining how incumbents manage to react to
rapid technical change, like Fujitsu did in the hard disk drive industry. We need to develop
new families of models capable of distinguishing and coping with the joint dynamics, of the
division of labor and that of knowledge. A paper by Dosi et al. (2002) begins to explore
these issues.
Second, and related to the ﬁrst point, we need to explore further the relationship be-
tween ﬁrm organization and environmental changes. Specialization and loose coupling are
often advocated as a suitable way of organizing business in the context of fast environmen-
tal changes. For example, Levinthal (1997) argued that ’[t]ightly coupled organizations
cannot engage in exploration without foregoing the beneﬁts of exploitation’ (p. 949).
However, cases like Fujitsu and Ericsson, show that some incumbents can actually manage
both exploration and exploitation activities. In our view, to make organizational sense of
these issues one needs to clearly distinguish between the organization of manufacturing
activities, and the organization of more knowledge-intensive activities. Moreover, learning
and manufacturing processes are embedded in dense networks that link manufacturers of
the ﬁnal product to suppliers of components and specialized knowledge. In innovative,
fast-changing environments it becomes more and more diﬃcult to pinpoint ﬁrms (whether
systems integrators or mere assemblers) as the correct unit of analysis. Problems are
solved ’socially’, and understanding how problem-solving strategies unfold within commu-
nities of specialists that cut across ﬁrm boundaries is a challenge to both practitioners and
scholars.
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